Boultbee on Article XIII: Of Works before Justification

Article to be the fruits of faith, they are distinguished from faith as the &uit is distinguished from the tree. Does not this cut up by the roots the attempt to explain faith in Art. XI. as including works ? Or can faith in Art. XI. be taken in one sense as fiiith together with works, and in Art. XII. in another sense as distinguished firom the works which it produces ?

’ Book iii. Appendix, chap. xii.

ABTICLE Xm.

Of Works before Juatifica- tion.

Works done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspi- ration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the School- authors say) deserve grace of congruity: yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.

jDe operihus antejustifi- cationem.

Opera quae fiunt ante gra- tiam Christi, et spiritus ejus affiatum, cum ex fide Jesu Christi non prodeant, minime Deo grata sunt, neque gratiam (ut multi vocant) de congruo merentur. Immo cum non sunt facta ut Deus ilia fieri voluit et prsecepit, peccati rationem habere non dubita- mus.

Notes on the Text of Article XIII.

The Latin word here used for inspiration is ^afflatus.* Where the English says * School-authors,’ the Latin, less precisely, has * multV The technical phrase * de congruo ’ answers to the English * of congruity.’ * The nature of sin ’ is in this Article, as in the ninth, ^peccati rationem,^

The Schoolmen asserted two modes of meriting reward, ^de congruo,^ and * de condignoJ* Man may merit at the hands of God in the former mode before grace has been received, in the latter mode after the reception of grace. Dr. Hey ^ gives this illustration to explain the distinction : * A servant deserves

• • Lectures on the Articles/ xiii. 14.

his wages ’ ex condigno ; ’ he may deserve support in sickness or old age, ’ ex congruoJ’ Sometimes, instead of ’ ex congrao,^ the phrase * ex proportione ’ is used.’

Beveridge ^ quotes from De Soto : * A work is congruous, to which a reward is not due from justice, but from a certain fitness ; ’ and from Homasus : ’ That is said to be merit ’^ de condignOf^ to which a reward must be rendered according to tJie requirement of justice, so that between the merit and the reward equality of quantity holds, according to the principles of mutual justice. But one is said to deserve ” de congruo,” when between the merit and the reward there is a parity not of quantity but of proportion.’ In plain English, the merit of condignity is such that there is an absolute Mlure of justice if it receive not recompense. This agrees with the doctrine of the Council of Trent noticed in Article XII. on works after justi- fication, and wiU explain our allusion there to the scholastic doctrine of merit. And though the principle of congruity claims less at the hands of strict justice, yet it amounts to an equal certainty, inasmuch as the Most High must be con- ceived as always and without fail doing that which is con- grous and proportional to His perfection and the nature of things to do.

Thus if man can ensure the bestowal of grace on the princi- ple of congruity when still in his natural condition ; and can claim it, after grace received, on the principle of condignity, or strict right and justice, we are brought round by a cir- cuitous path, and in spite of many words about grace, to much the same result as that which follows firom the doctrines of Pelagius, namely that man by working” in a particular manner ensures his own salvation.

This is one of the original Articles of 1552. No source is suggested for its expressions.

Observations on Article Xm.

The Fathers were naturally led to discuss the nature of heathen virtues, but this question was scarcely within the view

• Art. xiii. note.

122 ARTICLE Xm.

of the writers of the Article, although, no doubt, it comes ivithin its terms. What has been already said of the doctrine of congruity will explain what the Reformers really had in view in this Article.

The Council of Trent avoided the terms condignity and congruity^ to which some of its divines were much opposed ; but its decisions seem to adopt both principles. The follow- ing canon bears most directly on the subject before us: * Whosoever shall say that all the works which are done before justification, on whatsoever account they may be done, are truly sins, and deserve the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently a man tries to dispose himself for grace, the more grievously he sins, let him be anathema.’ * To which Calvin replied, after quoting other passages : *■ Let them anathematize the Apostle, who declares that without &ith it is impossible to please God (Heb. xi. 6). Let them anathematize Christ and Paul, who declare that all unbelievers are dead, and are raised from death by the Gospel (John v. 24, Eph. ii. 1).’

It is obvious that in this and other Decrees and Canons the Coimcil of Trent chose to state the condemned doctrine in the most oflfensive tenns, and in words which (however sus- ceptible of right interpretation) would not be deliberately adopted in the formal utterance of accredited divines. The doctrine of the present Article presents considerable difficul- ties to every mind which is not fully enlightened as to the true nature and abode of sin. There are few subjects, con- sequently, with respect to . which a delicate discriminatiou and careful handling are more necessary. While the truth should be firmly held, broad assertions readily misunderstood should be sedulously avoided. The following quotation from Bishop Beveridge on this Article is clear in its distinctions, and carefully discriminative in its language : ’ Though we have power to do such things as in themselves are pleasing to God, yet we have not power so to do those things that our doing them should be pleasing to Him. The matter of the actions we do may be accepted, but our manner of doing them is still rejected. Because though we do the thing that God

• Session VI. Canon 7.

commands of ourselves, yet we can never do it in the way that God commands.’

The truth is that the world, for the most part, never looks beyond the outer act. Some actions are sinful, some are virtuous. It can say little more. But the theologian cannot stop there. He knows that the real goodness of an action lies in the relation of the act to the mind which inspired it. One man from love, another from ostentation, another from cove- tous ambition, may perform some splendid act of public bene- fit. Outwardly, the transaction is identical in all these cases. The moral value of the act to the individual himself varies in each case from high virtue to absolute turpitude.

It is just lihis principle which is applied according to the rules of Scripture morality in the Article before us. That spiritual condition which can alone deliver a human being from the state of sin arnd condemnation being absent, whe- ther we view it on the side of justification or sanctification, there must be the taint of sin unremoved in all the actions. We do not herein confuse virtue with vice. We do not lose sight of the truth that there are many degrees in sin and in consequent responsibility (Luke xii. 47, 48). But as in the. Ninth Article we confessed that the concupiscentia remajjiing^ in the regenerate had, according to the Scripture standard, * the nature of sin ; ’ so now we are sadly obliged to own that the best actions of the unregenerated have ^ the nature of sin ’ likewise. Not that the action itself loses its right description as a virtue, but that in its origin and outcoming from the heart, in its relation to the spiritual nature of the doer of it, it could not fiiil to partake of the sinfulness which was in him.

The scriptural treatment and proof of this Article may be most soundly constructed upon the above line of argument.

Notes

• • Nature and Effects of Faith/ p. 422.