Beveridge on Article XIII: Of Works before Justification

in the state of integrity® that he had power also to fall down into a state of sin and misery; but as he was corrupted in Adam, he hath power to continue in his state of sin and misery, but no power of himself to rise up again into a state of holiness and integrity. Then his will was free, both to the good and evil; now it is free to the evil, not to the good. Then he could have chosen whether he would have sinned or

a Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites primos homines, id est, Adam et mulierem ejus bonos et rectos et sine peccato creatos esse cum libero arbitrio, quo possent si vellent humili et bona voluntate ser- vire atque obedire, quo arbitrio etiam possent si vellent propria voluntate peecare, eosque non necessitate sed propria voluntate peccasse. Aug. de fide ad Petrum, 21. [68. vol. VI. App.] Quapropter bina ista quid inter se differant diligenter et vigi- lanter intuendum est, posse non peccare, et non posse peccare ; posse non mori, et non posse mori; bonum

posse non deserere, et bonum non posse deserere. Potuit enim non peccare primus homo, potuit non mori, potuit bonum non deserere : nunquid dicturi sumus non _ potuit peccare qui tale habebat liberum arbitrium? Id. de corrept. et grat. [33. vol. X.] Credimus itaque bo- num et sine ulla carnis impugnatione a creatore omnium factum Adam, magnaque preeditum libertate, ita ut et bonum facere in propria facultate haberet, et malum si vellet posset admittere. Fulgent. de inearn, et grat. Christi. [epist. xvi. 15. |

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no; now of himself he cannot choose but sin, or he can choose nothing but sin. After our creation and before our corruption, we had power to do every thing pleasing unto God ; but after our corruption and before our regeneration, we have power to do nothing pleasing unto God. Though we have power to do such things as in themselves are pleasing unto God, yet we have not power so to do those things that our doing them should be pleasing unto him. The matter of the actions we do may be accepted, but our manner of doing them is still rejected. Because though we do the thing that God commands of ourselves, yet we can never do it in the way that God commands.

And hence it is here said, that there is nothing that we do before we receive grace can make us meet to receive grace, or, as the schoolmen say, “ deserve grace of > congruity ;” that is, we can do nothing for which it is so much as meet that God should bestow any thing upon us. As we cannot do any thing which it is just God should reward, and so deserve grace of condignity; so neither can we do any thing which it is fit or meet God should reward, and so deserve grace of congruity. So that God should not do what is unmeet and unfitting to be done, though he never reward any of the works of mere natural men. And the reason is clearly here asserted, Because they have all the nature of sin. And if they have the nature of sin and iniquity, certainly they cannot deserve grace of congruity. So that it cannot be meet that God should reward them, nay, it is rather meet he should not reward them. Nay, it is not only meet he should not reward them, but it is meet and just too that he should punish them ¢ ; justice requiring sin to be punished as well as

» Congruum est opus cui de justitia non debeatur merces, sed tamen ex congruitate quadam. Soto de nat. et gratia, 1. 2. c. 4. Nempe si doctioribus creditur, illud dicitur esse meritum de condigno, cui mer- ces reddenda est secundum justitie debitum, ita sane ut inter meritum et mercedem attendatur sequalitas quantitatis, quemadmodum in com- mutativa justitia tantum quantum.

De congruo autem dicitur quis me- reri, cum scilicet inter meritum et premium non paritas quantitatis sed proportionis dicitur. Romeeus. [p.

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virtue to be rewarded: and therefore if thy works be sins, they cannot in justice be rewarded, but punished.

But the only question here to be determined is, whether they be indeed sins or no. For if they be sins, there is nothing in this article but must be acknowledged for a real truth. For here it is asserted, that works before grace are not pleasing unto God, which if they be sins they surely can- not be; for he can be pleased with nothing but what is con- formable to his will and nature; yea, therefore, because any thing is conformable to his will and nature he is pleased with it. But sin is so far from being conformable, that it is flat contrary to both. So that so long as he is God he cannot but hate sin, and to be pleased with sin would be to act con- trary to himself. And as if the works of sinners be all sin they cannot be pleasing unto God, so neither can they deserve any thing from him but punishments. For in that they dis- please him, they must needs deserve his displeasure ; and in that they deserve his displeasure, they must needs deserve the greatest of punishments, his displeasure itself being the greatest of punishments. But now that all the works of un- regenerate men are indeed sins appears both from seripture, reason, and Fathers. ;

As for the scripture, it tells us, The plowing of the wicked is sin, Prov. xxi. 4; yea, The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomi- nation to the Lord, ch. xv.8. And ‘again, The sacrifice of the

d The ancient translations all carry the sense in this place another way. The words in the original are, mas VR WAIT 92 AN TWAyIn yw, which the Vulg. translates, Hostie impiorum abominabiles, quia offerun- tur ex scelere. And so the LXX, Ovoia aoeBdv BdeAvyya Kupie, Kat yap Tmapavopas mpoopéepovoew avras, which the Arabic follows cara 78a: and so the Syriac, Wax2r [arco aliaso flaxo: Vp. on [sh AN, ice. The sacrifice of the wicked as unclean, because they offer it wick- edly : and so indeed the ‘T’argum too, mM) omd RMayatT dion, because they offer it in wickedness. So that they all took *2 yx to signify se-

verally et quia ; whereas when they come together in a negative sentence they signify quanto minus ; as, The heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee, m3n N17 9D AR, how much less this house that I have built ? 1 Reg. viii. 27. In an affirm- ative sentence, quanto magis; as, Behold, the righteous shall be recom- pensed in the earth, som) YWID FR, how much more the wicked and the sinner 2? Prey. xi. 31; which the LXX. translates, Ei 6 pév Sikaos pods caw Cera, 6 doeBis Kal apapto- Ads rod Ghavetrat; And it is observ- able, that not only the Syriac and Arabic translations, but the apostle Peter himself, in his quotation of

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wicked is an abomination: how much more, when he bringeth it with a wicked mind? ch. xxi. 27. So that though he should possibly bring it with a good mind, yet, seeing he is a wicked man that brings it, it is an abomination to the Lord. And therefore he saith, I hate, I despise your feast-days, and I will not smell in your solemn assemblies. Though you offer me burnt- offerings, and your meat-offerings, I will not accept them: neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts. Amos v. 21, 22. He that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man ; he that sacri- Jiceth a lamb, as if he cut off a dog’s neck ; he that offereth an oblation, as if he offered swines blood; he that burneth incense, as if he blessed an idol. Yea, they have chosen their own ways, and their soul delighteth in their abominations. Isa. lxvi. 3. To what purpose therefore cometh there to me incense from Shebah ? and the sweet cane from a far country ? your burnt-offerings are not acceptable, nor your sacrifices sweet unto me. Jer. vi. 20. To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats. When you come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hands, to tread my courts ? Bring no more vain oblations ; incense is an abomination unto me; and the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, LI cannot away with ; it is iniquity, even your solemn meetings, Isa. i. 11, 12,13. And the reason is because, As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one: there is none that under- standeth, none that secketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are altogether become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Rom. iii. 10,11, 12. Not one of those that are bad persons can do any good actions: but the best of their performances, as well as the worst of their iniquities, is an abomination to the Lord.

Neither doth reason itself contradict this truth. For

this place, doth not follow the ori- ginal, but the LXX, though here they much differ from it, Kai «i 6 Sixaos pois catera, 6 doeBys Kat dpaprados rod pavetrar; 1 Pet.iv.18. Now this being the right notion of > HN, whensoever they come to-

gether in the original, our translators cannot be condemned, but com- ~ mended, for leaving the translations to stick to the text itself, in this as in other places, [and] rendering the phrase > 7x here, as it denotes elsewhere, even how much more.

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reason itself, as well as scripture, saith, that °a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, Matt. vil. 18; nay, @ corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit, ver.17. As the tree is upon which the fruit grows, so will the fruit be that grows upon that tree. If the tree be good, the fruit cannot be bad ; and if the tree be bad, the fruit cannot be good. And so if a man’s person be righteous, his actions will be holy; but his actions cannot but be sinful if his person be wicked. For it is the person that doth the actions whom God looks at in the first place, and then at the action that is done by the person. And therefore though the action be in itself good that the person doth, yet if the person be bad that doth the action, the action cannot but be bad too, as well as the person. For though the righteousness of a man’s person can never make a bad action good, yet the wickedness of a man’s person doth always make a good action bad. And therefore though a good man may do a bad act, yet a bad man ean never do a good act. But neither is the person only of a wicked man rejected, but his actions are also deficient ; and if they be defective in any one thing, that is enough to denominate them sins. An action cannot be good unless it be perfect in all things; but an action is bad that is defective but in one thing. But now how many things are there that all the actions of wicked men are defective in? There are two things especially they are defective in. And the first is that named in this article, even that they do not spring from faith in Jesus Christ. And the apostle tells us, that without faith it is impossible to please God, Heb. xi. 6. For whatsoever is nat of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. 23. Now that a wicked man hath not faith is clear, in that if he had faith he would not be a wicked man. For faith empties the heart of sin, and fills it up with grace. Faith justifies our persons, and sanctifies our natures. By faith we are accounted

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in similitudine duorum hominum posite sunt, id est justi et injusti; quia nisi quisquam voluntatem mu- taverit, bonum operari non potest. Aug. contra Adimant. Manicheum, ce. 26. [vol. VIII. p. 147.] ‘O 8e

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righteous before God, and made righteous by him. And therefore he that hath true faith can be no wicked man: and therefore also every wicked man can have no faith; and if he hath not faith, he cannot but sin against God, as the f Fathers long ago preached. And again, as what a wicked man doth is a sin, because not proceeding from faith, £so it is a sin also in that it is not directed to a right end: for a bad intention always makes even a good action bad, though a good intention can never make a bad action good. Now that all wicked men have wicked ends in all their actions is manifest, in that they are wicked men, men without the true knowledge of God, and men without the sincere love unto God. Now all such as do not truly know and love the God of glory can never sincerely aim

at the glory of God in what they do.

f Sunt quippe isti fideles, aut si fidem non habent Christi, profecto nec justi sunt, nec Deo placent, cum sine fide placere impossibile est. Aug. contra Julian. Pel. 1. iv. [25. vol. X.] Si gentilis, inquis, nudum operuerit, nunquid quia non est ex fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide peccatum est: non quia per seipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, peccatum est; sed de tali opere non in Do- mino gloriari solus impius negat esse peccatum. Ibid. [30.] Omne enim, velis nolis, quod non est ex fide peccatum est. Ibid. [32.] ‘“H glotis Tov emoTpepdpevoy moXitny ovipavav amodeixvucw’ 4 lotus Tov and yns avOperov Geov cuvdptdov amepyaterar’ ode eotw €Ew rigtews ayaOov. Chrysost. [epi miorews kai eis Tov mept proeas vdpov, vol. VI. p. 838. Et omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est, ut scilicet intelli- gat justitiam infidelium non esse justitiam, quia sordet natura sine gratia. Prosper. Epist. ad Ruffin. [p. 307-] Si fides non prima in corde nostro gignitur, reliqua que- que bona esse non possunt, etiamsi bona videantur. Gregor. Moral. 1. 2. [71.] _Quicquid sine fide preesumi- tur nulla est animi solida virtus, sed ventosa quedam inflatio et tumor inanis. Bernard. serm. [5.] de

For what I do not

ascens. Fides namque est bonorum omnium fundamentum. Aug. in prol. in 1. de fide ad Petrum. [vol. VI. App. 1.] Extra ecclesiam catholicam nihil est integrum, nihil castum, dicente apostolo, Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est. Leo serm. 2. de jejun. Pentecostes. [vol. I, p. 331.] Non ergo irrationabi- liter a quibusdam astruitur, quod omnes actiones et voluntates hominis sine fide male sunt, que fide habita bone existunt. Lomb. 1. 2. Sent. dist. 41.

& Noveris itaque quod non officiis, sed finibus, a vitiis discernendas esse virtutes. Officium est autem quod faciendum est, finis vero propter quod faciendum est. Cum itaque facit homo aliquid ubi peccare non videtur, si non propter hoc facit, propter quod facere debet, peccare convincitur. Aug. contra Julian. Pelag. 1. 4. [21.] Quicquid autem boni fit ab homine, et non propter hoc fit, propter quod fieri debere vera sapientia percipit, etsi officio videatur bonum, ipso non recto fine peccatum est. Ibid. [21.] Sunt opera que videntur bona sine fide Christi; et non sunt bona quia non referuntur ad eum finem ex quo sunt bona. Id. in Joh. tract. 25. (12. vol. III.]

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know, I cannot love; what I do not love, I cannot desire ; what I do not desire, I can never intend. And therefore if I do not know God, I can never intend his glory in my actions. And if I do not intend his glory in my actions, I sin upon that very account, because I do not intend his glory. For then I transgress the command wherein he enjoins me, that whether IT cat or drink, or whatsoever I do, I should do all to his glory, 1 Cor. x. 30.

But I needed not to have gone so far to have proved that a wicked man cannot do a good work. For there is nothing good without the chiefest good; neither can any one please God but by the assistance of God himself. For I cannot see how God can be pleased with any thing but himself consider- ing how he was infinitely pleased with himself before there was any thing else for him to be pleased with but himself; and therefore cannot be more pleased now there are other things made by himself; and by consequence, whatsoever thing he is pleased with, it is not the thing itself, but himself in the thing, he is pleased with. And the more of himself is in any thing, the more is himself pleased with it: and so the less of himself is in any thing, the less is that thing pleasing to him. Now it is plain a wicked man is without God in the world, Eph. ii. 12, and by consequence God not within him. For if he was in God, and God in him, it would be impossible he should be a wicked man. And seeing there is nothing of God implanted in him, there can be nothing pleasing unto God performed by him. And whatsoever is not pleasing unto God cannot be good, it being impossible for himself not to be pleased with what is truly good, seeing himself is the chiefest good. And therefore every thing that is good must needs proceed from himself, whom he cannot but be infinitely pleased withal. And therefore we cannot but in reason also acknow- ledge, that a man, before he hath received grace from God, can do nothing pleasing to him, yea, nothing but displeasing to him, nothing but sin.

And this was the doctrine delivered by the primitive church. St. Basil propounds the question, “whether it be

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possible, and a thing pleasing and acceptable unto God, for one that is the servant of sin to perform righteousness, according to the rule of the saints’ piety ; and he determines it from several places of scripture that it is not, concluding thus: ‘It is clear that it is altogether impossible, and dis- pleasing unto God, and dangerous to him that dares to do it. Wherefore I exhort, as the Lord teacheth, Let us first make the tree good, and then the fruit good; and let us first make clean the inside of the cup or platter, and then the outside will be wholly clean. And being taught by the apostle, Let us purify ourselves from all the pollutions both of flesh and spirit, and then we shall perfect holiness in the love of Christ, that we may be well-pleasing to God, and acceptable to the Lord, unto the kingdom of heaven.” Clearly shewing that until we first be good we can never do good.

This was the doctrine that St. Augustine defended; *“ Be it far from us” (saith he) “to think that true virtue should be in any one, unless he be a righteous man. And let it be as far from us to think that any one is truly just, unless he live by faith, for the just shall live by faith. And who of those who would be accounted Christians, unless it be the Pelagians, and amongst them perhaps thyself, Julian, only, will say that an infidel is just, will say that a wicked man is just, will say that a man enslaved to the Devil is just? Yea, though he were Fabricius, though he were Fabius, though he were Scipio, though he were Regulus, with whose names thou thinkest to terrify me, as if we were talking in the old Roman

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court.” And elsewhere he tells us, ’“ All the life of unbe- lievers is sin, and there is nothing good without the chiefest good: for where the knowledge of the eternal and unchange- able truth is wanting, there is but false virtue even in the best manners.” And again; ™“ The man is first to be changed, that his works may be changed ; for if a man remain in that estate that he is evil, he cannot have good works,”

Hence is that of St, Hierome: ”“ Let us pronounce our sentence against those that do not believe in Christ, and yet think themselves valiant, wise, and temperate, and just, that they may know that there is none can live without Christ, without whom all virtue lies in vice.” And therefore saith St. Bernard, °“ What have you philosophers to do with vir- tues, who are ignorant of Christ the virtue of God? And St. Gregory, ?“ If faith be not first begotten in our hearts, all the other things cannot be good, though they may seem good.”

And so Prosper ; 1“ Though there have been some who by their natural understanding have endeavoured to resist vices, yet they have barrenly adorned only the life of this time; but they could not attain to true virtues and everlasting happi- ness. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; neither can any one please God without God himself.” And elsewhere: “ And so it manifestly appears, that in the minds of wicked men there

m Prius est mutandus homo ut opera mutentur. Si enim manet homo in eo quod malus est, bona opera habere non potest. Id. de verbis Dom. Serm. [72. 1. vol. V.]

n Sententiam proferamus adversus eos, qui in Christum non credentes, fortes, et sapientes, et temperantes se putant esse, et justos; ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hie- ron, in Gal. c. 3. [vol. VII. p. 433.]

© Quid vobis philosophis cum virtutibus, qui Dei virtutem Chris- tum ignoratis? Bernard. Serm. in Cant. 22. [p. 814.]

P Si fides non prima in corde nos- tro gignitur, reliqua queque bona esse non possunt, etiamsi bona vi- deantur. Gregor. Moral..1. 2. [71.]

4 Etsi fuit, qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitiis reluctari, hujus tantum temporis vitam steriliter or- navit; ad veras autem virtutes zeter- namque beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiam quod virtus videtur esse peccatum est ; nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Prosper. de vocat. gent. 1. 1.

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Notes

• Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio zter- ne et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est etiamsi in optimis moribus. Id. de vera innoc. c. 106. [vol. X. App.] |