Gibson on Article X: Of Free-Will

The original Article of 1553 consisted only of the latter part of our present Article, beginning with the words, ’* We have no power,” etc.^ Its language was evidently suggested by a passage in Augustine’s work, On Grcu;e and Freewill^ in which he says that ” we have no power to do good works without God working that we may have a good will, and co-operating when we have that good will.” 2

The clause which now stands first in the Article was prefixed in 1563 by Archbishop Parker, being taken by him from the Confession of Wiirtemberg.^ The object of

^ •* Working tcUh us ” was substituted for “working in us ” as a translation of “co-operante” in 1571.

” De Oratia et Libera Arbitrio, xvii. : “Sine illo vel operante ut velimus vel co-operante cum volumus, ad bonu; pietatis opera nihil valemus.”

^ ” Quod autem nonnuUi affirmant homini ])ost lapsum tantam animi iutegritatem relictam, ut possit sesc naturalibus suis viribus et bonis

the Article of 1553 is to disavow all sympathy with the Anabaptist denial of the absolute need of grace. This is indicated by a passage in the Eeformatio Legum Ecclesiasticaruniy in which, after a condemnation of the revival of the Pelagian heresy of these fanatics, we read : ” Et similiter nobis contra illos progrediendum est, qui tantum in libero arbitrio roboris et nervorum ponunt, ut eo solo sine alia speciali Christi gratia recte ab hominibus vivi posse constituant.” ^ But the clause added by Parker from the Confession of Wurtemberg seems also designed to condemn the theory of ” congruous merit,” which will be considered under Article XIII. There are two subjects which call for some consideration in connection with this Article —

1. Freewill.

2. The need of Grace.

I. Freewill,

It will be noticed that, although the title is Of Freewill, yet it is scarcely warranted by the substance of the Article that follows, in which freewill in the abstract is neither asserted nor denied. The title, then, of this Article, as of some others, is not quite accurate, and a more exact one would be “of the need of grace.” ^ What is denied in the Article is the power and ability to turn to God and do good works without the assistance of God Himself : what is asserted is the absolute need of grace preventing and co-operating : but of ” Freewill ” in itself nothing whatever is directly said.

The statement of the first part of the Article follows

operibus, ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac praeparare, haud obscure pugnat cum apostolica doctrina et cum vero ecclesise Catholicse consensu.” — De Peccato. See Hard>vick, p. 125.

» De Haren. c. vii. ’ Cf. Forbes On the Articles, p. 152.

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naturally and directly from the view of ” original sin ” maintained in Article IX. It was there shown that the Church of England regards original sin as no mere ” privatio ” or loss of higher goodness only ; but rather as a “depravatio naturae,” a real corruption of our nature, “whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil.” If this is true, it follows as a necessary consequence that

the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God.

The position, then, taken up in the Article is that, though the will may be left free by God, yet there is in unaided man a lack of power. This is the teaching of the ” Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man” (1543), with which the Article is in substantial agreement.

” Though there remain a certain freedom of the will in those things that do pertain to the desires and works of this present life, yet to perform spiritual and heavenly things, freewill is of itself insufficient; and therefore the power of man’s freewill, being thus wounded and decayed, hath need of a physician to heal it, and an help to repair it.” ^

II. The need of Grace,

While the Article thus neither affirms nor denies the freedom of the will in the abstract, its teaching on the absolute necessity of Divine grace for the performance of works that are “grata Deo” is clear and decisive.

We have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will

It is especially needful to remember, in studying this Article and those which immediately follow (XL— XIII.), that they are concerned with God’s method of dealing with those who are brought into covenant with Him through Christianity, and that what is said in them has little or no bearing on the case of those who live and die without ever having heard the gospel of Christ. Their case is not contemplated. Such terms as ” faith and calling upon God,” ” good works, pleasant and acceptable to God,” “grace of God by Christ preventing us … and working with us,” etc., are expressions which properly refer to Christians ; and therefore nothing that is said in these Articles need necessarily raise questions as to the ” good works ” of the heathen, and the light in which they are regarded by God. All that need be said is that they are not what the Articles call ” good works, pleasant and acceptable to God ” (Deo grata et accepta). This phrase, which we meet with here for the first time, is almost a technical one, used for the works of Christians done in a Christian spirit and from Christian motives. Thus it is used in Article XII. of those good works which ” are the fruits of faith, and follow after justification.” These are said to be “grata Deo et accepta in Christo ” ; whereas, according to Article XIIL, ” works done before the grace of Christ and inspiration of His Spirit ” are ” minime Deo grata.” More will be said on this subject when these Articles are reached. But so much it seemed necessary to say at the outset in connection with the first occurrence of the phrase. To return now to the teaching of the Article before us : It

states that twofold grace is needed — (1) preventive yrcuie (gratia praeveniens), inclining the will to choose the good ; * and (2) co-operating grace (gratia co-operans), assisting man to act, when the will has already been inclined to choose the good. The technical phrase “gratia praeveniens ” is apparently due to Augustine, who makes use of it several times,^ and it seems to have been suggested to him by the Latin of Ps. lix. (IviiL) 10 : ” Deus mens misericordia ejus praeveniet me,” a text which he quotes frequently. The term ” gratia co-operans ” is also his,^ and, like ” preventing grace,” is based on Scripture. See PhiL ii. 13: ” For it is God that tvorketh (qui operatur) in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure”; and compare [S. Mark] xvi. 20 : ” The Lord also working with them ” (Domino co-operante). On the necessity of both kinds of grace, the teaching of Scripture, which is faithfully reflected in the Book of Conmion Prayer,* as well as the Articles, is clear and definite. The beginning, the middle, and end of man’s salvation is influenced by God. For the need of preventing grace, besides the passage just cited from Phil. ii. 13, it is sufficient to refer to our Lord’s own words in S. John vi. 44 : ” No man can come to Me, except the Father which sent Me, draw him,”

’ For scholastic teaching on grace and the divisions into gratia operans and co-operans, as well as into gratia prseveniens and subsequens, see Aquinas, Summa 1""^ 2* Q. cxi.

’ De Gratia et Libera Arhitrio, c. xvii.

• See the Collect for Easter Day: “Almighty God … we humbly beseech Thee, that, as hy Thy special grace prevcTiting us Thou dost put into our minds good desires, so by Thy continual help we may bring the same to good effect.” The Seventeenth Sunday after Trinity: “Lord, we pray Thee that Thy grace may always prevent and follow %ts, and make us continually to be given to all good works ” ; and the fourth Collect at the end of the Order of Holy Communion : ** Prevent us, 0 Lord, in all our doings with Thy most gracious favour and further vs with Thy continual help.”

and to such a phrase as that used in Acts xvi. 14, where the Lord is said to have ” opened the heart ” of Lydia, “to give heed unto the things which were spoken hy God.” While for co-operating grace reference may be made to S. Paul’s attribution of all that he did, not to himself, but to ” the grace of God which was with ” him (1 Cor. XV. 10; cf. Gal. ii 20); and to our Lord’s teaching in S. John xv. 4, 5 : ” Abide in Me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine ; so neither can ye, except ye abide in Me. I am the vine, ye are the branches : he that abideth in Me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit ; for apart from Me ye can do nothing.”

But while we thus, on the one hand, in dependence on the teaching of Scripture, assert the absolute need of grace, and trace everything good in man to the action of Him from whom alone cometh ” every good gift, and every perfect boon” (S. James i. 17); yet, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to insist, still in fullest harmony with the teaching of Scripture, — which everywhere assumes man’s responsibility and power of responding to God’s claim, — upon the freewill of man ; for so only can any sense of human responsibility be developed.^ We cannot, indeed, reconcile and harmonise the two counter-truths of freewill and the need of grace ; but we can hold them both,^ and place them side by side, as S. Paul himself does in the passage already quoted. ” Work out your own salvation with fear and

» ** There can be no question that S. Paul fully recognises the freedom of the human will. The large part which exhortation plays in his letters is conclusive proof of this.”— Sanday and Headlam On the Romans, p. 216.

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trembling ” (there is man’s freedom, for it is idle to tell him to ” work ” unless he is free to work or not to work), ” for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure ” (there is the need of grace, both preventing and co-operating).

The teaching of S. Paul in Rom. viL shows more clearly perhaps than any other passage, the state of the case as regards the freedom of the will, and makes it apparent that, though left free by God, the will of man has since the Fall been warped in the direction of evil, and thus man finds himself, as it were, under two different and incompatible laws. On the one hand, he approves of the law of God, and acknowledges himself bound to obey it. On the other, he feels that he is under the dominion of another law which continually leads him to sin. ” To will (to OiXciv) ^ is present with me ; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would (o OiXo)) I do not : but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now, if I do that which I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that, when I would do good (tg) Oi\oim ifiol iroielv rh Ka\ov)y evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man : but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members ” (vers. 18-23). This double state or condition in which man finds himself is recognised by heathen poets and moralists.2 It has in its favour the testimony of facts,

• It must be noticed that S. Paul does not use the word /3ot;Xo/iat, which ‘Mays the greater stress on the idea of purpose and deliberation,” but only ^Aeiv, the more emotional word. Sec Sanday and Headlam in loc. - The lines of Ovid are well known —

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So Seneca asks : ” What is it which, while we are going one way, drags

and our natural instincts which lead us while recognising our freedom and moral responsibility to refer everything that is good in us to God. But Scripture alone throws any light on its origin. Man’s greatness is fallen greatness. This is the only explanation of the perpetual contrast between man’s aspirations and man’s achievements, the greatness and nobility of the one, and the lamentable failure of the other. The doctrine of the Fall is the key to the riddle of human nature.^

It only remains to point out how this Tenth Article avoids opposite errors in connection with the difficult subject of Grace and Freewill.

(a) By its guarded reference to Freewill, which it neither asserts nor denies, it escapes the error into which Luther fell, of using such extreme language on the slavery of the will as practically to amount to a denial of human responsibility.^

(6) By its direct assertion of the absolute need of grace preventing and co-operating, it avoids the Pelagian heresy revived by the Anabaptists, which denied the necessity of grace and supernatural assistance.

(c) The terms in which the need of grace is spoken of are so worded as to avoid altogether the unscriptural views of the Anabaptists, and the exaggerations of the Calvinists, who maintained a theory of “irresistible

us another, and impels us thither, from whence we are longing to recede ? What is it that struggles with our soul and never permits us to do anything ? We vacillate between two opinions : We will nothing freely, nothing perfectly, nothing always.” — Ep. lii.

• Cf. Pascal, Pens6eSy arts, xviii.-xxii.

’ See the language from his treatise De Servo Arbitrio, quoted in Bishop Browne On the Articles, p. 259 : “In his actings towards God, in things pertaining to salvation or damnation, man has no freewill, but is the captive, the subject, and the servant, either of the will of God or of Satan.” “If we believe that God foreknows and predestinates everything … then it follows that there can be no such thing as freewill in man or angel or any other creature.”

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grace.” ^ Such views were still more effectually excluded by the Tenth Article of 1553, which was headed “Of Grace,” and followed the one before us.

De GfrcUia,

Gratia Christi, seu Spiritus Sanctus qui per eundera datur, cor lapideum aufert, et dat cor carneum. Atque licet ex nolentibus quse recta sunt volentes faciat, et ex volentibus prava, nolentes reddat, voluntati nihilominus violeutiam nuUam infert. Et nemo hac de causa cum peccaverit, seipsum excusare potest, quasi nolens aut coactus peccaverit, ut eam ob causam accusari non mereatur aut damnari.

Of Grace,

The grace of Christ, or the Holy Ghost by Him given doth take away the stony heart, and giveth an heart of flesh. And although, those that have no will to good things, He maketh them to will, and those that would evil things. He maketh them not to will the same : yet nevertheless He enforceth not the will. And therefore no man when he sinneth can excuse himself, as not worthy to be blamed or condemned, by alleging that he sinned unwillingly or by compulsion.

This was certainly primarily aimed at some among the Anabaptists who ” seem to have been pushing their belief in absolute predestination to such frightful lengths that human actions were esteemed involuntary, and the evil choice of man ascribed to a necessitating fiat of his Maker.”* Its omission by Archbishop Parker in the revision of 1563 is probably due to the less formidable character of the danger of Anabaptism at that time. But it is possible that Parker was influenced by the fact that the Article was likely to be displeasing to some of the Marian exiles, who had returned to England with strong predilections in favour of Calvinism, and whom it

1 This is closely connected with Calvin’s teaching on Predestination, which will be considered below under Article XVII.

was desired to retain in the Church. The excision of the Article would remove a stumbling-block from their path, as there is nothing in our present Article to which they could take exception, though from their point of view they might consider that its statements required supplementing.

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De Hominis Justificaliom.

Tantum propter meritum Domini ac servatoris nostri Jesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera et merita nostra, justi coram Deo reputamnr : quare sola fide nos justificari, doctrina est saluberrima, ac consolationis plenissima : ut in Homilia de justificatione hominis fusius explicatur.

Notes

• See Formularies of Faith, p. 360. Cf. also the Tridentine statement on the subject (Sess. VI. c. i.) : ” Freewill, attenuated and bent down as it was in its i>owers, was by no means extinguished.”
• Serm. 176, § 5 ; 2)« Nat. et Gratia, § 35 ; Cmtra duos Epist. II. § 21. Cf. Bright’s ArUi- Pelagian Treatises, p. xix.
• Cf. Augustine, De peccatorum fnerUis et remissione, II. c. xviii. : ” [Nature] forbids us so to maintain God’s grace as to seem to take away freewill ; and, on the other hand, so to assert its liberty as to lay ourselves open to the censure of being ungrateful to the grace of God in the arrogance of our impiety.”
• Hardwick, p. 99. Cf. the letter of Bishop Hooper (quoted in vol. i. p. 22), where it is said of the Anabaptists that “they maintain a fatal necessity, and that beyond and beside that will of His, which He has revealed to us in the Scriptures, God hath another will, by which He altogether acts under some kind of necessity.”