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Forbes on Article X: Of Free-Will

Alexander Penrose Forbes, 1871

Commentaries on Article X: Rogers (1607)Ellis (1660)Burnet (1699)Beveridge (d. 1708)Welchman (1713)Practical Exposition (1716)Veneer (1725)Madan (1772)Hey (1796)Tomline (1799)Wilson (1821)Jones (1849)Trollope (1850)Browne (1850)Forbes (1867)Boultbee (1871)Maclear & Williams (1895)Green (1896)Gibson (1896)Jackson (1900)Bicknell (1919) · Article 10: text, context and Study

Article X. Of Free-Will

The condition of Man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith, and calling upon God: Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.

Text: Book of Common Prayer (1662)

Cleaned OCR; [...] marks passages cut for illegibility. See the scan. Text: An Explanation of the Thirty-nine Articles, by A. P. Forbes, Bishop of Brechin (first published 1867–68 in two volumes), 2nd edition in one volume (Oxford and London: James Parker, 1871). Cleaned OCR from the Internet Archive scan; [...] marks passages too garbled to recover.

work of regeneration, his justification becomes of ne cessity the mere imputation of the righteousness of another, there can be no correspondence with God’s work by man in the life of the Christian. On the other hand, grant that in fallen man, though “Icesus in naturalibus, destitutus in gratuitis,” there still exists the capacity for the love of God, there remains full scope for a supernatural transfiguration. Divine grace- stoops to this lowliness, imparts to the free-will and sin-polluted faculties a heavenly consecration, really cleanses, strengthens, and matures the soul, leads him on from strength to strength, making him daily better, holier, and more Christ-like, till the hour of his trial is accomplished f.

1 Vide Moliler, Symbolism, 31 — 13-i.

A est hominis post lapsum Ada conditio, ut sese natura- libus sit-is riribus, ct bonis operibus, ad /idem ct inro- cationem Dei converters ae pr&parare non possit. Quare •absque gratia Dei (qua per Christum est) nos praeve- miente, ut velimtts, et coopcrante, dum volumus, ad pie- iatis opera facicnda, qu& Deo grata stint et acceptay nihil valemus.

“Of Free- Will

<(TuE condition of man after the fall of Adam is uch, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his wn natural strength and good works, to faith and •ailing upon God : wherefore we have no power to do rood works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without he grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we nay have a good will, and working with us, when we nave that good will.”

THIS is one of the instances in which the title of the Vrticle does not correspond accurately with its con tents. In the Article there is no direct assertion of the free-will of man, nor definition of its meaning, though t is implied in its very limitation. The Article ought eally to be termed, ” Of the necessity of Divine grace.” The whole of man’s responsibility rests on the freedom

of his will. Some philosophers have maintained that the only argument for the existence of God is to be found in that responsibility. It is therefore one of the gravest of doctrines. If there is no freedom, there can be no virtue nor vice, no merit nor fault, no moral government of the universe. The opposite of freedom is necessity. Once grant necessity, and the idea of God is nearly eliminated from our system. And so with regard to ourselves, under the domination of an impe rious necessity we become mere machines. “No in animate creatures, neither any irrational animals, but all rational and intellectual beings, whether angels or men, have free-will. Free-will is not a habit, whether natural or acquired, but an appetitive power, the prin cipal and proper act of which is election. Will and free-will, 6e\r](j-is /cal (Bovkijcris, voluntas ct lib. arb.t are not two powers, but different acts of the same power. Will has immediate reference to the filial cause, free-will to secondary or intermediate causes. Eree-will never chooses evil, but always good, or ap parent gooda.”

” Deadly sin, which is an act of free-will, as the choice of that which is absolutely bad, arises from igno rance or error. Yenial sin, as the choice of that which is in itself good, but without due order of measure and rule, arises from absence of consideration. Doubting1 is not of the essence of election, but is an accident of its exercise in an erring nature. The will is always convertible in this life, but the converting power may

» Cf. St. Aug., De Grai. et Lib. ArUt.y c. xvii. al. xxxiii.

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be withdrawn. In the future life, the will of the blessed will be confirmed in good ; the will of the re probate obstinately established in evil. Christ’s human will was as the will of the blessed saints. In respect of His own goodness, which God wills of necessity, He has not free-will, but in respect of contingent events God is said to have free-will.”

And yet the subject is most mysterious. The re conciliation of the knowledge and ordination of God with the freedom of the human will is one of those mysteries which has occupied the subtlest intellects, and when those intellects have worked to the utter most, the question is left where it was at the begin ning. It is therefore enough for us to maintain the two truths, and leave their reconciliation to a higher state of intelligence. Yet, while philosophical thought sustains these two apparently contrarian t truths both floating in the mind, there will always be tendencies one way or the other. Some minds will lean rather to the side of freedom, and the excess of that will be Pelagianism ; other minds will lean to that which takes an exaggerated view of the province granted by God to grace, and that excess will lead to Luther- anism and Jansenism. The Church of God has to hold the balance between the two. On the one hand, she seeks to develope to the highest degree the sense of individual responsibility, seeking to convince every soul of the unspeakable importance of the passing of each hour, making our eternity to depend on the good or evil use of time : on the other hand, she systematizes

the beautiful doctrine of grace ; maintains that all that is great and of good report in man is the result of a condescendence on the part of God to the creation of His hands; that the beginning, middle, and end of man’s salvation is influenced by God ; and that there is a perpetual overflowing effluence from the Person of our Lord and from His Spirit, sanctifying, illumining the soul of man, and aiding him in the search for truth, and in the operation of good. Thus it will be seen that in every good action, there are two factors — a divine and a human. As is right, God’s holy work goes first, suggesting, exciting, quickening; then fol lows man, freely yielding himself to the divine impulse. God offers freely and man accepts, and the double work becomes a unity. For His own good purposes, God respects human freedom. He does not force things. Man may resist grace, for the moral order of the world is founded in liberty.

Luther, however, from his view of original sin, was driven to deny the freedom of the will. In spiritual and divine things, according to him, man i? as the pillar of salt into which Lot’s wife was turned; yea, he is like a stick or stone, which is lifeless, and has no use of eyes or mouth, or any organ of the senses b. Calvinists, while by their juster view of original sin they were able to admit the co-operation of man in the work of salvation, denied however that grace could be resisted c. According to them it was not in the power of man to receive or reject the action of God. When

b Luther in Genes., c.xix. c Calv. Tnst., lib. ii. c. 3, n. 6.

divine grace knocks, the door must be opened. It works invincibly, and those who enter not into life have never had grace, a theory which lands us at the door of the doctrine of predestination. The contro versy with these, as well as with the Jansenists, turns on this phase in the question.

The only-begotten Son of God assumed our nature, among other reasons, that He might rescue mankind from that infection and penalty, which by the fault of our first parents it had contracted, and to recall it to communion with God, and raise it to eternal felicity. For God proposed ” in the dispensation of the fulness of times, that He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are 011 earth ; even in Him d.” This gathering toge ther chiefly consists in the justification of the sinner, and in the aids and assistances whereby man is able to attain to this, and to persevere in it so attained, and to bring forth the fruits thereof, till he attain to everlasting life.

This at once brings us to the consideration of grace, of which the efficient cause is God, the meritorious cause our Lord Jesus Christ, and the final cause ever lasting.

By grace, taken in its widest sense, we mean every gift or benefit either external or internal which is be stowed out of the mere liberality of God upon the rational creature. In this sense creation, preservation, and their accompanying blessings, — much more, law, A Eph. i. 10.

teaching, good example, and such like, — may be called by the name of grace. Again, the word may be ap plied to supernatural gifts, and to those miraculous powers which are bestowed rather for the benefit of others than for our own sakes (gratia gratis data}. But the true and rigorous sense of grace (gratia gratum faciens) is that inward help, freely bestowed, which God for the merits of Christ grants to fallen man, both ta help his infirmity in the way of abstaining from that which is evil and doing that which is good ; so also to raise him to the supernatural state, in making him fit to perform supernatural actions, so that he may attain unto justification ; and having so attained may persevere until he come to everlasting life.

This again is divided into habitual and actual. Habitual grace is a supernatural quality permanently inhering in man, making him well-pleasing to God by formally and intrinsically sanctifying him. Actual grace is a certain motion within us excited by God, by which, first, the intellect is led to recognise good and evil, and then the will is led to follow the one and avoid the other in order to the blessed life of heaven.

Habitual sanctifying grace is twofold : first and second : —

First grace is that by which the sinner is first justi fied, and from being an enemy is made the friend of God. It is called ‘first,’ because it presupposes no other habitual grace, being itself expulsive of sin, and is conferred by baptism and penance.

Second grace is the increase of the first, it preserves the first grace, being given to him who has thus re ceived it. It is conferred by Confirmation, the Holy Eucharist, Orders, the Anointing of the Sick, and Matrimony. Moreover, by prayer, by meditation, by the reading of God’s Word, by deeds of mercy, and by every good action done in a state of grace do we acquire it.

Actual sanctifying grace is threefold : —

i. Prevenient, antecedent, or exciting grace ;

ii. Assisting, co-operating, or concomitant grace ;

iii. Subsequent, or completing grace.

  1. Prevenient grace is a supernatural motion of the soul, to will what is good, and to nill what is evil.

  2. Assisting grace is that by which God, when we will and so will that we do, co-operates with us to will and do that which lie had previously stirred us up to.

  3. Subsequent grace is that which follows, strength ens, and confirms the consent of the free-will.

Again, grace is divided into sufficient and effica cious grace : —

Sufficient grace, taken specifically, is that which, although it affords sufficient power to produce an effect for which it is ultimately given, does not produce it in defect of the consent of man.

Efficacious grace is that which always and infallibly infers the ultimate result, and the co-operation of the ireewill.

Holy Scripture makes mention of both these graces :

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of sufficient — ” My grace is sufficient for thee e.” ” I can do all things through. Christ that strengtheneth mef.” Ezekiel mentions efficacious grace, “I will put My spirit upon you, that ye may walk in My com mandments s •” and St. Paul, ” It is God that worketh in us, both to will and to do of His good pleasure h.”

It is a true proposition, that to fallen man grace merely sufficient is granted, which, in defect of the consent of his free-will, is frustrated of the effect ulti mately intended by God.

Pelagians denied this, rejecting all grace ; Calvin, and Luther maintained that all grace was efficacious, so efficacious that the will acted under compulsion. Baius and Janscn agreed with them. Yet the Scripture goes to prove the contrary, as e.g. Isaiah v. : ” O ye in habitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge be tween Me and My vineyard; what more could I have done to My vineyard that I have not done in it? I waited for grapes, and behold it brought forth wild grapes.” ” 0 Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, how often would I have gathered thy […] stretched forth My hands all the day long to a rebellious and gainsaying people k.” ” Ye do al ways resist the Holy Ghost l” ” We beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain™1.”

Sufficient grace is bestowed on all men : ” That was the true light, which, coming into the world,

e 2 Cor. xii. 9. f Phil. iv. 13. £ Ezck. xxxvi. 27.

h Phil. ii. 13. J St. Matt, xxiii. 37. * Horn. x. 21 ; Isa. Ixv. 2.

1 Acts vii. 51. m 2 Cor. vi. 1.

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lighteth all men n.” ” God willeth that all men should be saved, and should come to the knowledge of the truth0.” “There is nothing hid from the heat thereof P.”

As corollaries of this we may deduce the following propositions : —

  1. Man, aided by the grace of God, which is wanting to no man, can keep the commandments of God, as did Zacharias and Elisabeth, walking in all the ordinances of the Lord blameless.

  2. He who does what in him lies by the power of grace, grace shall not be denied to him, as in the case of the conversion of Cornelius.

  3. No one by his natural powers can obtain actual grace, or the beginning of spiritual life. “No man can come unto Me except the Father who sent Me draw him q.” ” Without Me ye can do nothing r.”

  4. An equal grace may be sufficient in one case, and efficacious in another, as in our Lord’s denunciation of Chorazin and Bethsaida in contrast with Tyre and Sidon.

  5. Nay, sometimes less grace converts men, while under the influence of higher grace others remain har dened, as the men of Nineveh were converted by the grace given through Jonas, and the Jews resisted the grace offered by our Lord Himself. So the fallen angels and Judas may be presumed to have received greater grace than many who are saved. Hence we

n St. John i. 9. ° 1 Tim. ii. 4. P Ps. xix. 6.

i St. John vi. 44. r St. John xv. 5.

gather that grace in the second stage is rendered efficacious by the co-operation of the human will ele vated by assisting grace. Thus St. Paul exhorts us not to receive the grace of God in vain : words which clearly warn us to give efficacy to grace by our co-operation, yet that co-operation is not a bare naked co-operation, but a co-operation elevated by grace.

  1. Grace causes no constraint to the will, for it can be resisted. If man is not free, he cannot deserve nor fail in deserving, nor be rewarded nor be punished. Scotus, with a sort of grim pleasantry, and in the spirit of his age, proposes, that they who deny free-will should be exposed to tortures, until they learn that it is possible that they cannot be tortured.

The question of grace was not only discussed in the fourth and fifth centuries against the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, and in the sixteenth against the So- cinians, but since the Reformation the question has again and again come up ; among Protestants in. the case of the Arminians and Socinians, among Roman Catholics in the case of the Jansenists and Molinists s.

s The error of Jansenism will best be understood by transcribing the five condemned propositions of the Augustinus. Whether the propo sitions were in the book or not, is not the question now with us. It will be seen that the Church’s instinct was wise in stigmatizing them : —

I. Some precepts of God are, according to the present powers be stowed on man, impossible to those who are just, willing, and striving ; also the grace is wanting to them whereby they may become possible.

II. In the state of fallen nature, inward grace is never resisted.

III. For merit or demerit, in the state of fallen nature, there is not required in man liberty from necessity, but liberty from compulsion only (co-actione).

M

Although much has been done in the elucidation of the various truths which hinge upon it, it may be said that the matter is by no means exhausted, and the relations of man to the Sacraments, the discrimination of the orders of nature and grace, the relation between theo logy and medicine in some questions of morals, and many similar questions, still require development and exposition.

AVhen we speak of the state of grace, by the word ’ state’ we technically mean that condition under which human nature is conceived of, in reference to its ulti mate end according to the laws of Providence. It is divided into the status termini, the condition of those who possess and enjoy the end of man ; and the status via, the condition of those who are militant here upon earth.

The statm rice is threefold — 1 . the state of innocence, 2. the state of fallen nature, and 3. the state of nature restored by Christ.

  1. The state of nature is that in which Adam was placed by God, free from sorrow, misery, and death, with that integrity of nature by which the senses and affections were perfectly subject to the empire -of reason, and with original righteousness, and sane tifying grace.

IV. The semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient inward grace for every act, one by one, even for the beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics, that they denied that grace to be such as the human will can resist or obey.

V. Ib is semi-Pelagian to say that Christ in effect (omnino) died and shed His blood for all men.

  1. The state of fallen nature is that miserable con dition of the posterity of Adam, who are not yet freed by baptism from the original “culpa” which it receives from him.

  2. The state of repaired nature is that in which men are set free and redeemed by the grace of Christ.

These are all the conditions in which man in via can be or has been ; but to elucidate the subject more, theologians have discussed what are termed possible states, e.g. : —

  1. Whether a state of pure nature is possible, in which man can be without vice, and without grace, subject however to the infirmities and miseries to which we are subject.

  2. Whether a state of perfect (Integra} nature is possible, in which man might be destitute of super natural aid, and not raised to supreme blessedness, yet gifted with such aids of nature as to be free from our miseries, and by the natural virtues to obtain a blessed ness corresponding with them.

  3. Lastly, whether a state of fallen nature, not to be repaired, is possible, in which man would have been after the sin of Adam, if God in His infinite mercy had not freed him.

Now to state clearly the errors on these subjects : — The Pelagians, in the beginning of the fifth cen tury, denying original sin, and asserting that Adam was constituted by God as men are now born, without any aid of nature, and without the auxiliary of super natural grace.

This heresy was revived in the sixteenth century by the Socinians, who, denying original guilt, taught that Adam was created mortal and liable to all our present miseries.

A close approach to this is the Arminian doctrine which, as expounded by Limborch, acknowledges in Adam no supernatural gift, no indclita prcvrogativa, although they allow that he was gifted with a certain knowledge necessary to him in his then estate, and with a rectitude which precluded inordinate concu piscence, and even concupiscence itself, inasmuch as, there being no law, there might be without guilt the most free exercise of the will.

Although contrary to the Pelagians and Socinians, they teach that Adam might have been free from death in virtue of the fruit of the tree of life ; they never theless maintain that man, by virtue of even his pre sent natural powers, might tend towards, arrive at, and possess God as his last end and highest good ; and, moreover, that Adam’s sin, save as a bad example, has in no way done damage to the race of man.

Calvin, Luther, Baius, and the Jansenists agree with the Pelagians and Socinians as to man’s original lack of supernatural gifts and graces, and the original suf ficiency of his natural powers ; but they go farther, and declare him to be now despoiled of some of the properties and perfections of that nature.

Quesnel held that the grace of Adam was subsequent to his creation, was due to the integrity of his nature, and produced only human merit. According to him

Adam’s integrity, sanctity, and all other his prero gatives were conditions inseparable from, and proper ties due to nature not yet depraved by guilt.

The orthodox faith teaches that Adam, as constituted in the estate of innocence, was endowed with super natural grace, was established in righteousness and holiness, was free from misery and death, was subject neither to concupiscence nor to passion. Moreover in him every affection was entirely under the control of his reason.

As to the miserable estate of fallen human nature, in which the race of man now finds itself by reason of Adam’s sin, — deprived of the indellta dona of nature, subject to our present miseries, to concupiscence, to the powers of the devil and to the wrath of God, and in fected with Adam’s guilt, propagated by generation, — the orthodox faith teaches that all men descending from Adam, even the children of the faithful, are born infected with original sin, deprived of their right to eternal felicity, children of wrath and vengeance, and liable to everlasting damnation.

Baius, Jansenius, and Qticsnel, taught that in man, after Adam’s sin, libertas indlffcrcntice was wanting ; that for merit or demerit it was sufficient to be free from compulsion, not to be free from antecedent and inevitable necessity. Hence, inter alia, they say that men are guilty of deadly sin even in things which they cannot avoid, and that the involuntary motions of concupiscence are real sins ; that God commands

impossibilities ; and that even to just men some of His precepts are impossible *.

Such is the doctrine of the grace of God, as it has been formulised by the Church in opposition to con- trariant errors. It is the work of the Divine Word in His Incarnate Nature, the universal Truth, the Eternal Beauty, the Light that shineth into the soul of man. He, the Light of celestial spirits, speaks by an inward voice in the ears of all men ; and as without the sun the universe would be in night and death, so without the Word the kingdom of the powers of the next world would be without life and heat. Grace is that mighty aid to holy action, added to what we are and to what we know by the inspiration of the most ardent and enlightened charity u. For the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, that the soul now made whole may work, not from the fear of punish ment, but from the love of righteousness. Of grace it is said : ” The mountains shall drop sweet wine, and all the hills shall melt;” for the mountains and hills of Judah, with their terraced, vine-clad sides, are but a faint shadow of the joys and real delight and glad fruitfulness of this supereminent gift of God. Of grace it is said : ” Thou shalt prevent him with the blessing’s of goodness,” for the blessings of goodness are the grace of God whereby He works in us, that we delight in and love that which He teaches us ; so that if God

Notes

  • Ferraris, JBibliotkeca de Gratia, Venices 1770. u St. Augustine, vol. x. p. 246 D.

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