Boultbee on Article I: Of Faith in the Holy Trinity

the Holy Ghost.’ The original Latin corresponds m the same exact manner with that of our present Article. As the definitions of so great a divine as Melancthon must be valuable, it may be well to add from the same Article of the Augsburg Confession the definition of the word Person : * The name Person is used in the same sense in which ecclesiastical writers have used it in this matter, to signify not a part or quality of something else, but that which has a proper existence of its own ’ — {quod proprie suhsistit).

Observations on Abticjle I.

It is assumed that the reader is sufficiently aware of the principal varieties of belief as to the nature of the Deity which have prevailed in diflTerent times and countries. It is beyond the limits of this work to give even a sketch of the history of the misbelief of man on this fundamental subject ; and a mere catalogue of names is a worthless thing for practical purposes. It may, however, be desirable to name the principal classes under which the varieties of human notions of the Deity are arranged. The dire name of Atheism needs no definition : * The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God.*

Deism is a general expression for the notions of those who believe in One God, the Creator, and in some moral relation to Him, but who reject revelation.

Theism is an ill-defined term, often used as equivalent to deism, but sometimes as including something more, and as the opposite to atheistic ideas.

Poll/theism holds that * there be Gods many,’ personal ex- istences, sharing among themselves in various degrees the divine power.

Pantheism holds that * the universe is itself God, or of the divine essence.’ All organised matter, all sentient being, it views as appertaining to the Deity, coming from Him, returning to Him, and always in Him. There is, therefore, no personal God distinct from the creature he has made. This was the inner belief of many of the ancient philosophers. It is also that of the Buddhists, and lies at the root of Brahminism. It

has also been revived in various forms in some schools of modern European philosophy. In further illustration of these portentous aberrations of the human intellect, a passage full of indignant eloquence is subjoined from a charge of the late Bishop of Peterborough (Dr. Jeune).

^Material Atheism, — ^In the last and at the beginning of the present century, it was a material and mechanical athe- ism which attracted the vulgar of scientific men. It was the atheism which denies all existence but the existence of n>atter — of matter eternal, and containing a divinity called Force in every atom ; the atheism which regards thought as a mere secretion of the brain, and vice and virtue simply as products, ” like sugar or vitriol ” ; the atheism which sees order, but not design, in the universe — laws, not Providence, in the course of things.

• Pantheism. — To this blank and revolting materialism suc- ceeded pantheism, as revived in Germany — the system which confounds the Infinite and the finite, and which makes Grod the sum of all things. God, it teaches, is brutal in brute matter, mighty in the forces of nature, feeling in the animal, thinking and conscious only in man. This system is, in its first aspect, more noble than material atheism, but in truth it is not less fatal to all that is noble and good. It, indeed, makes man — nay, the beast that perisheth ; nay, the very dung on the earth — divine ; but it also makes God human, animal, ma- terial. It degrades what is high by exalting what is low. Better to deny God, after all, than to debase Him. Pantheism is, if possible, a worse atheism.

• Positivism, — Of both these systems, positivism — ^the system which at this moment claims exclusive possession of truth; positivism, for such is its barbarous name, to which all thought, we are told by a leading review, in Germany and England, as well as in France, its birthplace, is now converging — speaks with no less contempt, though with less hatred, than it speaks of Christianity. ” Day-dreams,” it says, ” are all the assertions, all the negations alike, of philosophers : impotent attempts to compass impossibility.” Of God, if there be a God ; of the soul, if there be a soul ; of revelation, if revelation there be, man

can know, man need know, nothing. Away, then, it cries, with mere hypothesis ! To the positive, to the material, to the teaching of the senses, to observation of &cts, philosophy must limit itself. ’ This system is mean, though supercilious. Perhaps, however, positivism rises in comparison with atheism, which itself is less base than pantheism ; for it is better to ignore than to deny, as it is better to deny than to degrade God.

• Suicide of Philosophy. — Human reason, then, left to itself, leaves us, as to God, a threefold choice : we may deny God, we may degrade God, we may ignore God. A noble result ! A godless philosophy ends in suicide ! So it will ever be. To quote from the noble close of the Dunciad —

’ Philosophy, which leaned on Heaven before, Sinks to her second cause, and is no more.

• Destruction of Morality, — ^As is the theology, so is the morality of all these systems. One specimen of their ethical teaching will suffice for all. Hear Spinosa, the greatest of pantheists : — ” Every act of man, as every fact of nature, is produced by fated laws. Free-will is a chimera, flattering to our pride and founded on our ignorance. Not only has every man the right to seek his pleasure, he cannot do otherwise. He who lives only according to the laws of his appetites is as much in the right as he who regulates his life according to the laws of reason, in the same manner as the ignorant man and the madman has a right to everything that his appetite com- pels him to take. A compact has only a value proportioned to its utility ; when the utility disappears, the compact dis- appears too. There is folly, then, in pretending to bind a man for ever to his word, imless at least that the man so contrive that the breach of the contract shall entail for him more danger than profit.”

• Practical Results of false Philosophy. — Utter heartless selfishness, restrained by cowardice, is then to be our sole rule of life ! Our final destiny is to perish like the brute ; or, like bubbles, to be absorbed, when we burst into the ocean of being on which we now float !

• These systems may for a time prevail ; but their preva- lence cannot be permanent or universal.’

Amongst Christians, there are, strictly speaking, only two divisions on this subject, Trinitarians and Unitarians. The former include the vast majority of the Christian world. The Unitarians include persons holding a great variety of opinions, verging downwards from Arianism and Socinianism, with more or less belief in Holy Scripture as a revelation from €rod, to mere deism.

L The Unity of God,

It is the object of this work to bring into one focus, as &r as possible, the somewhat scattered reading of the theological student. Looking also to the scanty time allowed the aspirant to the ministry of the English Church for acquiring the rudi- ments of theological science, it is most desirable to give him, as far as possible at this stage of his progress, one treatise only on each main doctrine. And this one treatise ought in each case to be that which has gained the general approval of the Church, and is recognised as a text-book for holy orders. In this point of view, it seems essential to take the guidance of Bishop Pearson imder this and the four following articles. The student in divinity will either have read, or is purposing to read, the great work of that prelate on the Creed. But for the sake of completeness, and at the same time not to take the student over superfluous ground, there is subjoined a sketch of such portions of * Pearson on the Creed ’ as bear on the present Article.

1. • There is hut one limng and true God,^ the passage with which our Article begins, will receive illustration from * Pear- son on the Creed ’ (Art. I. § 2, * I believe in God ’), the sub- stance of which may be thus given : —

The true notion of God is that of a Being, self-existent, inde- pendent of any other, on whom all things else depend, and governing all things.

We are assured of His existence, not by a connate idea (for God has never held us responsible on this score), nor as a

self-evident truth or axiom ; but by the necessity of assigning an origin to things having existence, and from the perfect adaptation of means to ends in creation, or the relation of final causes to the efficient cause. Pearson would give weight also to the testimony of conscience, and the universal consent of mankind to the existence of God.

That God is One is deduced first from the primary notion of God, which has been defined as implying independence, and there cannot be two independent beings coexistent and acting together. It further follows from the unity of design and of government in creation. Thus God is One, and not only acUially One, but the only possible Supreme. He has an intrinsic and essential singularity.

2. […] That God is everlasting will follow from the notion of His self-existence and independence, for -He has His existence from none. And it is asserted in numerous pas- sages of Scripture, which need not be here specified.

3. • Without hody, parts, or passions.^ — This doctrine is in several places asserted by Pearson (see the Articles * Which was conceived ’ and * Suffered ’), but is not separately handled. It follows from the fundamental notion of the self-existence and independence of God. A body is subject to the laws of space and of limitation, it is divisible and local, it can suffer from other bodies ; the whole notion is subversive of the true idea of God. There will be no difficulty in quoting sufficient pas- sages of Scripture under this head.
4. • Of infinite power, wisdom, and […] deals with the almightiness of God in Art. I. § 4, and Art. VI. § 3, and treats it as involving these main particulars : the absolute power of free-will, the absolute right of possession of all things, the absolute right of using and disposing of all things ; further, that God is the source of all power in any creature, that there can be no resistance to His will, and no limit to His power, save that which involves a contradiction, physical, rational, or moral. The infinite wisdom and goodness would follow in like manner from a survey of the divine perfections; and all these attributes will be readily confirmed by Holy Scripture.

This creation is further to be conceived of as the bringing all things out of that which had no previous existence, in opposition to ancient fallacies about the eternity of matter. Several passages of Scripture imply this. But it follows from the primary notion of God ; for to suppose anything existing independent of God, and coeval with Him, detracts from His independence and self-sufficiency.

In regard of motive, we are to believe that nothing but the goodness of God moved Him to create. No necessity lay upon Him, and His own will was a sufficient cause for the production of all that He willed to exist.

In respect of time, all created things were called into exist- ence at definite times known unto God.

That God is the Preserver of all things follows also from the necessary idea of the dependence of all things upon Him.

IL The Trinity in Unity.

We have already noticed the definition of the term person given in the Augsburg Confession. It may be desirable, before entering on the details of the present section, to pursue that subject somewhat further. Waterland, in his * Second Defence of Some Queries ’ (qu. xv.), thus defines the term : * A single person is an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, he ; and not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters.’ The rationality or intelligence is meant to distinguish a person from an individual of the brute creation, to which he allows personality only in a modified analogous sense. The absence of division is intended to exclude a collective intelligent agent, as an army or a senate.

In this sense the Trinity is not a person. A man, an angel, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, the separated soul, the God-man, are each of them single persons. * All other persons, save the three divine Persons, are divided and sepa- rate from each other in nature, substance, and existence. They do not mutually include and imply each other. • . . But the divine Persons being imdivided, and not having any separate existence independent of each other, they cannot be looked upon as substances, but as one substance distinguished into several supposita, or intelligent agents.’

There are compound persons also. Man’s soul and body together make a compound person, and yet only one person.

A man does not say we, but I. The God-man is a com- pound Person, consisting of soul, body, and the Logos. But the result is one Person. * The same Christ made the world, increased in wisdom, was pierced by a spear.’ He is spoken of in Scripture as * one I, one He, one Thou, whether with respect to what He is as the Logos, or as having a soul or a body.’

In our discussion of the great doctrines now before us, it will be necessary to anticipate in some measure Articles H. and V. ; for we shall have to take these three separate pro- positions. The Father is God. The Son is God. And the Holy Ghost is God.

The first of these needs no proof. There is no question

about it. We pass, therefore, to the second. It must be

noted that this is a matter of pure revelation. It is believed

as a direct deduction from certain passages ; and, if possible,

it follows still more certainly from the whole spirit of the New

Testament, that the Son is God, and a distinct Person in

Himself.

This subject is handled by Pearson (Art. H. §§ 3 & 4,

• His only Son our Lord ’). Having spoken of Jesus Christ

as the Son of God, Pearson proceeds with the following

argument : —

1. Jesus Christ had a real existence before His incarnation,

as will appear from the following passages : * What and if ye

shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before ? ’

THE TRINITy IN UNITY. 11

(John vi. 62) ; * He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for He was before me ’ (John i. 15) ; * Before Abraham was, I am ’ (John viii. 58) ; * By the Spirit He went, and preached ix) the spirits in prison. … in the days of Noah ’ (1 Pet. iii. 18-20) ; * By whom also He made the worlds ’ (Heb. i. 11); &c.

2. The pre-existent nature of the Son was not created, but essentially divine, as appears from the following argu- ments.

a. It follows of necessity from the fact of creation being ascribed to Him ; for this is absolutely a divine attribute.

h. It follows also from the familiar passage Phil. ii. G, 7, which, being argued out, shows that the Son was in the form of a servant as soon as He was made man, but that before this He was in the form of God. The word form {fioptfii])^ being used in both clauses, applies as really to the divine as to the human nature.

c. Jehovah describes Himself thus, * I am the First, I also am the Last ’ (Isa. xlviii. 12). The same is said of the Son (Rev. i. 11).

d. That which in Isaiah vi. is spoken of Jehovah is in John xii. 41 referred to Christ.

e. In several passages Christ is called God, especially Col. ii. 9.

/. In several other places (e.g. Jer. xxiii. 6 ; Mai. iii. 1 ; Isa. xl. 3) the name Jehovah is used, and the same is referred in the New Testament to Christ.

Hence we conclude that the Son of God has an essentially divine nature.

3. Next, He has this divine nature not of Himself, but as communicated from the Father.

a. Because of the absolute unity of the divine essence, which will not permit the existence of two divine Persons independently existing.

b. The divine nature being indivisible, the whole and not a part of the Deity must be thus communicated. * I and the Father are one.’ This is the o/xoovtriov of the Nicene fathers.

4. This communication of the divine essence is of such a

nature that it is called in Scripture the generation of the Son (Heb. i. 5).

In the case of human generation, man begets a son in his own likeness, but with a separate individuality from his own. God, as the Father^ has a more perfect relation to God the Son, in that He communicates the whole nature and pro- perties of the Deity, not by dividing Himself, but by a full communication of Himself.

Hence it is concluded that the Son is God. But that He is not the same Person as God the Father, inasmuch as they stand in a peculiar relation in respect of origin, and because in many passages they are plainly distinguished from each other in will and operation (e.g. John v. 30, 37 ; xvi. 26, &c.).

The third main proposition before us is this: The Holy Ghost is God.

We refer again to Pearson (Ai-t. VIII. * I believe in the Holy Ghost’). The mode of dealing with this subject may be thus exhibited : —

1. The Holy Ghost is a Person, and not a mere quality or influence, because—^

a. He is contrasted with evil spirits, who are persons. See the cases of Saul and Micaiah.

h. He can be grieved, He makes intercession, searches all things, distributes spiritual gifts, spake to Peter and to pro- phets at Antioch. As the Paraclete, He is sent, teaches, testifies, comes, reproves, guides, speaks. AU these are Personal acts.

2. The Holy Ghost is not only a Person, but uncreated and divine.

a. See 1 Cor. ii. 11.

h. The sin against the Holy Ghost is irremissible. Since all sin against God is not so, sin against a created being can- not be impardonable.

c. (John i. 3). All created things were made by the Son. But the Spirit of God was in the beginning (Job xxvi. 13), and therefore is not a creature.

d, (Luke i. 35). Jesus is called the Son of God as being conceived by the Holy Ghost, who must, therefore, be God.

e. Further proofs are alleged from the followiDg passages : —

2 Cor. iii. 15-17. Acts v. 3, 4. The lie to the Holy Ghost is a lie to God. 1 Cor. vi. 19. The inhabitation by the Spirit makes man a temple of God. Acts xxviii. 25. The Holy Ghost is identified with Jehovah.

/. The divine attributes — Omniscience, Omnipotence, Om- nipresence — are attributed to the Holy Ghost

3. But though a Person and divine, the Holy Ghost is noi to be confused with the Father or the Son. For —

a. He proceeds from the Father (John xv. 26) ; therefore He is not the Father.

h. He receives of that which is the Son’s, and glorifies the Son. He is sent on condition of the Son’s departure (John xiv. 26, and xvi. 7, 14) ; therefore He is not the Son.

c. He is distinguished from both Father and Son (Matt. iii. 16 ; Eph. ii. 18, &c.).

The above is a brief sketch of the argument of Pearson in support of the doctrine before us, that in the unity of the Godhead there he three Persons^ of one substance^ power ^ and eternity : the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

The Trinitarian controversy in the Church of England belonged chiefly to the commencement of the eighteenth century. In 1685 the celebrated work of Bishop Bull ap- peared, the Defensio Fidei Niceni, It is a learned investiga- tion of the opinions of the fathers of the first three centuries on the doctrine of the Trinity. It remains the standard work on that part of the subject. Bishop Bull died in 1709, and the controversy took another form, mainly in consequence of the publications of Dr. Samuel Clarke, which were considered to be a revival of Arian opinions. This led to the valuable treatises of Waterland on the Trinity ; they appeared in suc- cession for some years, and remain as a copious storehouse of theology on the various points of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

A short treatise, entitled ‘The Catholic Doctrine of a Trinity proved from Scripture,’ by Jones of Nayland, of which thero is an edition published by Eivington, will be found a brief and able compendium, which may be useful.

ARTICLE 11.

Notes

• . * The Maker and Preserver of all things^ visible and in- […] attributes of the Godhead are arranged by Pearson under Art. I. § 5, * Maker of heaven and earth,’ where he shows that heaven and earth must be understood as including all things visible and invisible. (CoL i. 16, &c.) Hence foljows the definition * Everything is either made or not made. Whatsoever is not made is God. Whatsoever is made is not God.’