Bicknell on Article XXI: Of the Authority of General Councils

that the primary function of the Church is that of witness. It ends by producing a Christianity that is outside the range of criticism because it has abandoned nearly everything that is worth criticizing. It leaves men with a ‘religious experience ’ that is an experience of nothing in particular. Modernism contains no Gospel.

For Modernism see : The Programme of Modernism. Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis. Mediaevalism. Christianity at the Cross Roads. Will Spens, Belief and Practice, Lects. 1-5. Chandler, Cult of the Passing Moment, iv. § 2, and v. Forrest, The Christ of History and Experience, pp. 3-5 and Lect. VIII. For Modernist teaching in the Church of England :

Faith and Freedom. Emmet, Conscience, Creeds, and Critics,

Of the Authority of General Councils.

General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes. And when they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God,) they may err, and some- times have erred, even in things pertaining unto God. Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.

De auctoritate Concihorum Generaloum. Generalia Concilia sine jussu et voluntate Principum con- gregari non possunt; et ubi convenerint, quia ex hominibus constant, qui non omnes spiritu et verbo Dei reguntur, et errare possunt, et interdum errarunt etiam in his quae ad Deum pertinent ; ideoque quae ab illis constituuntur, ut ad salutem necessaria, neque robur habent, neque auctoritatem, nisi ostendi possint e sacris literis esse desumpta.

Practically unchanged since 1553. It is significant that the original

draft had included the following clause: ‘ Kings and pious magistrates can without waiting for the decision or gathering together of General Councils, in their own state according to the word of God, decide about matters of religion.’ Happily this was struck out before publication.

The Article from first to last is aimed at the Council of Trent. The Church of England declared in advance that she did not feel under obligation to accept its decisions.

§ 4. (a) If the Church possesses authority in controversies of faith, she must have some means of exercising that authority. What steps can she take to defend her faith from false interpreta- tions and unauthorized additions or diminutions? The bishops are the normal organ of the Church’s teaching power. They have authority to proclaim the truth in her name. We find this authority in the earliest days claimed and used by the Apostles. St. Paul or St. Peter bears witness to the faith as it is to be believed by loyal members of the Church. They do not claim to originate new truth but to hand on under the guidance of the Holy Spirit

what they had received. So, too, Timothy and Titus are sent with like authority to teach in the name of the Church (1 Tim. 4ir18, 2 Tim. 2, 42, Tit. 31°). In later days this duty passed to.the bishops. But since this teaching authority is ultimately of the nature of witness, an individual bishop may from lack of knowledge or judgment fail to express the true voice of the Church. No one has yet maintained that omniscience or infallibility are among the gifts conferred by consecration. In such a case it is clearly incumbent upon the other bishops to correct him. The bishops are the guardians of the faith not only as individuals but as a body. We can find examples of such action within the New, Testament. The action of St. Peter in eating with men uncircumcised was challenged and St. Peter made his defence before the Apostles and the brethren (Acts 113 and 48), Later at Antioch he was publicly rebuked by St. Paul for refusing to eat with Gentiles and apparently accepted the rebuke (Gal. 24”). The Council of Jerusalem originated in a dispute caused by the conduct of certain teachers at Antioch. The dissension was ended by the united action of the whole Church. The point at issue was a question of practice involving a question of doctrine, the relation of the Jewish Law to the Gospel. The Apostles and elders met together. St. James as president summed up the debate and proposed a motion. This was adopted and took the form of a letter. The decision of the Council was ratified by its acceptance on the part of the whole Church (Acts 15).

The later system of synods is the working out of this same principle. By the third century it had become part of the regular organization of the Church that the bishops of neigh- bouring Churches should meet together at least once a year for discussion.*

Probably the earliest meetings were chiefly for purposes of common action on matters of discipline, e.g. excommunications. In a missionary church then, as to-day, without such common action discipline would cease to exist. But their action soon was extended to ‘deeper questions for the common good.’ f Further, these synods tended to become no longer merely small local gatherings but to include a large number of bishops from a

• Tert. On Fasting, c. 13. Y;

wide area.* From the first their decisions had taken the form of canons or laws. But the area of the jurisdiction of a synod remained for a long time quite vague, and its decisions needed to be recognized by the Churches to which they were addressed. The independence of the local bishops was only slowly checked. Again, just as the bishop might err, so the local synod might err. As in the case of bishops safety lay in corporate action and discussion, so in the case of synods security was sought by comparison of decisions and by intercommunication between synods. By this means the witness of distant parts of the Church was obtained, and certainty might be gained by collecting the testimony of many independent witnesses. By the growth of the local synod and the intercourse between different synods the Church was able in a very real way to reach decisions on matters of faith. The vital importance of these synods is shown by the attempt of the Emperor Licinius to suppress them, as the surest means of damaging the Church. t

(6) With the appearance of a Christian Emperor a new era opened. Constantine was above all anxious to preserve the unity of the Church. Only a united Church could render the maximum of service to the empire. Accordingly he gladly accepted the appeal of the Donatists to settle their dispute with the Catholics. He nominated four bishops, including the Bishop of Rome, who with fifteen others held a council. The Donatists were condemned. At first Constantine rejected their appeal from the decision of the Council, but at length in his desire for unity he called together ‘very many bishops from different and in- numerable places ’ to meet at Arles. Here we find, for the first time, a synod fairly representative of the whole of the Western Church. This had been made possible by the assistance of the Emperor. The Donatists were again condemned.

So the way was prepared for the first ‘General Council,’ that of Nicaea. The rise of Arian teaching in Egypt threatened to divide the Church. The Bishop of Alexandria had attempted to quell it, but without success. Constantine was obliged to resort to his old plan and summon a Council, this time from East and West alike. Hence it is clear that the idea of a ‘ General Council ’

• H.g. sixty bishops met at Rome in 251 to condemn Novatian. Eighty-seven

met at Carthage in 256, etc. + Eusebius, Life of Constantine, i. 51,

did not originate spontaneously in the Church, but was introduced from without. As has been well said, ‘The conception of a General Council did not give rise to Nicaea, but vice versa.’ The idea struck the imagination of the Church and commended itself to her as a visible realization of her fellowship and as the crown of the synodical system. So Nicaea became only the first of a long series of Councils that claimed the title of ‘ General.’

(c) The question arises, what is the test of a council’s claim to be a ‘General Council.’ It was a question very much in evidence at the time of the Reformation. The Pope had sum- moned the Council of Trent as a ‘ General Council.’ The King of England among other Christian princes had been cited to attend. In actual fact it was composed solely of bishops of the Roman Church. Not only was the Eastern Church unrepre- sented, but the Reformers held aloof. Hence the Church of England refused to acknowledge that its decisions were necessarily binding on her. This explains the tone of Art. X XJ, with its want of enthusiasm for ‘General Councils.’ The writers had in mind not the great General Councils of the past, whose decisions they accepted with all reverence, but the Council then sitting at Trent. When the Article speaks of ‘ General Councils ’ it means those that make a claim to be general, as Trent did. We must balance the language of the Article by the language of the Reformers elsewhere.*

Our Article makes three statements about such councils.

(a) ‘General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes.’ This is a hit at Trent, which was convened by the Pope. ‘May not’ (non possunt) means more than ‘ cannot as a matter of fact,’ though this is true enough. _ A Prince could forbid his subjects to attend or dispense a ‘ General Council ’ by the use of force. ‘May not’ means rather “may not lawfully.’ As a matter of simple history the first eight acknow- ledged ‘General Councils’ were convened by the Emperor. As we saw, the very idea of such originated with Constantine. He made its assembling possible for the first time, not only by legal- izing the position of Christianity, but by offering free conveyance

• Hg. in a closely parallel passage the Reformatio Legum Hcclesiasticarum, speaking of the four General Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon, writes ‘magna cum reverentia amplectimur et suscipimus.’ So

one of the Homilies speaks of Six Councils as ‘received of all men.’ Cp. also the language of Hooker. I. x. 14, V. liv. 10, VIII. ii. 17.

at the imperial cost to all the bishops. So later councils were summoned not by the Pope but the Emperor. Chalcedon, indeed, was summoned at the request of the Pope, Leo, but by the command of the Emperor Marcian. Indeed, because of the civil interests involved, it could not be otherwise. So the state- ment of the Article is true historically. The Pope claimed the right of convener in the sixteenth century, but such a claim is not in accordance with antiquity and has been denied by many Roman authorities. If we ask the further question, why should the State to-day be consulted about the holding of a council ? would a council held without the sanction of the State be ipso facto irregular? We must remember that the Articles here, as elsewhere, assume that the Princes are Christians. The Emperor acted in his capacity as the first layman of the Church. The consent here required is a part of that ‘royal supremacy ’ which is explained later. If the State has become secular, circum- stances have altered and the wording of the Article no longer holds good. Even so the fact remains that the civil power can forbid its citizens to attend such a council or refuse to allow it to be held in its dominions.

(8) ‘ When they be gathered together (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the spirit and word of God) they may err and sometumes have erred even in things per- taming unto God.’ This again is an appeal to history. No one can deny that councils which a priort would appear to have as good a claim to be entitled ‘General’ as any, from their size and representative nature, have fallen into error and their decisions have been reversed. For instance, the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia decided in favour of Arianism. The Council of Ephesus, nicknamed ‘ Latro-cinium’ or the ‘ Robber- council,’ decided in favour of Monophysitism, and its decisions were reversed at Chalcedon. So again in the later Iconoclastic controversy, we find one set of councils deciding in favour of the use of images and another set reversing their decrees. With these facts before it our Article hints that the Council of Trent may likewise fall into error, for all its claim to be ‘general.’ The reason given is also in the fullest accord with the evidence. The conduct of the bishops at Nicaea was not perfect. At later councils it was positively scandalous. Even at Chalcedon there was intimidation and brawling. Such only

showed that all those present were not entirely governed by the Spirit of God. Hence their decision might readily be swayed by passion or self-interest. *

(y) Things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, wnless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture. A General Council was summoned not to add a new doctrine to the substance of the Christian faith but to make plain what Christians had always believed and to say ‘no’ to novel interpretations that were inconsistent with it. Their duty was to witness to the faith once for all delivered. Hence the decision must be based on Scripture. To symbolize this a copy of the Gospels was placed on a throne in the middle of the assembly. Hence the Church of England stated in advance that she was not bound to accept the decisions of Trent unless they were based on Scripture.

We are bound, therefore, to ask, how we can decide what councils that claim the title of ‘General’ are really ‘ General.’ The only answer that meets all cases is that the oecumenicity of a council depends on the after-reception of its decisions by the whole Church. The decrees of even the largest and most repre- sentative council are not the Church’s last word on the subject. They are an important stage in the Church’s ascertainment of the true faith, but they need to be ratified by the general accep- tance of the Church at large, not necessarily at the moment but after consideration. The reason why the Council of Nicaea is reckoned as General and the Council of Ariminum is not, is that in the long run the Church recognized the decrees of Nicaea as representing her mind. Accordingly we are prepared to find that different councils are accounted as ‘General’ in different parts of the Church. The English Church has recognized four— Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon. To these are sometimes added two more, the second and third of Constanti-

• Cp. the candid opinion of Gregory of Nazianzum in a letter of 382. ‘If 1 must speak the truth, I am of a mind to shun every assemblage of Bishops, because I have never seen a good end to any synod, nor remedy of evils but rather an addition to them. There are always contentions and strivings for dominion (do not think I am using too strong language) beyond description ’ (Ep. 130, al. 55, cp. also Ep. 124 al. 84).. Elsewhere he likens the younger bisbops at the Council of Constantinople to wasps (Carmen, xi. 1. 1686) and says it was a disgrace to be among such ‘hucksters of the faith’ (Carm. xii. 1 163). Cp. Turner, op. cit. p. 166. See also Salmon, Infallibility, cc. xvi-xvii

nople, which only ratified the decisions of previous councils. The Eastern Church would add those of Nicaea in 787 and Constantinople in 879. The Roman Church would add many others, though Roman historians are not always consistent with one another. It is worth noting that at all six the Westerns were very inadequately represented.

At the present day the divisions of Christendom render a ‘general’ council impossible. Great though the loss be, we must not exaggerate it. For the first three centuries no such council was practicable, but men could ascertain the mind of the Church as a whole by the comparison of local traditions and teaching. A verdict thus gained falls short of the deliberate and considered judgment of a council, but it is not to be despised. The question has often been asked, what right has, e.g. the Church of England to put forth an authoritative statement of belief such as these Articles. The Reformers made it clear that they only put forth these Articles, subject to an appeal to a free general council, when such could be held. In other words, the authority of the Church of England represents the experience of the Church of England. She does not suppose that she has nothing to learn from other Churches. A statement of truth that is based upon the life and witness of the whole Church must possess an authority that one based on the life and witness of only a section of the Church can never possess.

Cp. Our Place in Christendom, Lect. I. Collins, The Authority of General Councils and The Teaching Power of the Church.

§5. What then is the relation of the authority of the Church to the judgment of the individual ?

(a) If even a general council, fully representative of the whole Church, may err, what guarantee do we possess that the whole Church may not fall into error on some point ? The only possible answer is to refer to the doctrine of grace. What our Lord promised to His Church was not infallibility, but an infallible guide, the Holy Spirit. As we saw, in the case of the individual the grace of the Holy Spirit is not irresistible, it requires the co-operation of the human will. The same is true of the Church, which is composed of individual men and women. The guidance of the Holy Spirit is not irresistible : it is not a substitute for intellectual or moral effort. The Church

may through sinfulness miss or reject it. Just because the Church is not perfectly holy, therefore she is not perfectly responsive to her infallible Guide. Thus even a decision that is issued by a general council is not infallible. The more general the council and the wider the acceptance of its decision, the more it repre- sents the deliberate and considered opinion of the Church and the greater the authority with which it comes to us. But general councils are not an automatic machinery for turning out infallible utterances.*

On the other hand, we do believe in the perpetual guidance of the Holy Spirit and that He will not suffer the Church to go far astray without revealing the truth to faithful servants of God within the Church. An Athanasius is raised up to stand against the world. Thus the way is prepared for a return from error. Again and again truths that have been neglected or obscured have been recovered in such a way. A later generation is able to correct and revise the decisions of the earlier., Further, as we have seen, the more ‘Catholic’: the Church becomes, the better-proportioned her hold upon truth will be. Every race will be able to make its own contribution. The Church’s decisions will be based on a wider and completer experience. In proportion as the Church grows in holiness and in fulness of life, she will grow in the true knowledge of God.

(6) In the last resort the belief of the individual must depend upon those faculties for the discovery and recognition of truth with which God has endowed him. Our Lord did not shrink from appealing to man’s power of choice. He did not demand a blind acceptance of His teaching, on penalty of condemnation. He asked for faith, which is an activity of the reason and the will. No one can shift the personal responsibility for faith on to the shoulders of others. This is true even of those who wish to hand over their responsibility for what they believe to an infallible Church or an infallible Pope. The initial act of surrendering their power of decision must be their own. So, too, the continuous acceptance of the decisions of such an external authority is an internal act of will, albeit of a slothful will. Even the most rigid system of authority cannot deny the need of * private judgment,’ though it reduces it to the act of swallowing official utterances with the minimum of moral or intellectual digestion.

B44: THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES

How, then, can the individual find out the truth? Not only is it hard to ascertain the mind of the Church on many points, but her witness is divided. We can only answer that in religion, as In all subjects, there is not and never has been any easy or obvious road to the attainment of a complete and unerring statement of truth. The individual will naturally start from the official teaching of that Christian body whose life he has shared. In so far as this life has satisfied his moral and spiritual needs, he will be disposed in favour of the doctrinal teaching that underlies it. We must not exaggerate the difficulty of his task. There is a large central body of Christian truth that is common to all Christians, enough to form a starting-poimt for a Christian life. The primary truths of the faith as summed up in the Creed are unmistakeable. The real difficulties begin when we pass on to secondary truths. These include detailed explanations of primary truths and matters of Church order and discipline that involve questions of doctrine. In all such discussions a man must be guided by reason and spiritual per- ception. He has the right to demand the Scriptural basis of all teaching presented to him. Where the meaning of Scripture is not clear, he must turn to the tradition of the Church and to the decisions of councils when such can be had. Appeal must also be made to great teachers, ancient and modern. We need not only the exegesis of the Fathers, especially of those who spoke Greek as their native tongue, but the accuracy of modern scholarship and research. Where our various teachers disagree, we must use our reason to weigh the arguments on either side. The more that a teacher appeals to us by the holiness of his life, and the more that his words come home to us with spiritual power, the more ready we shall be to trust his judgment. We must always remember that the experts in the Christian religion are the saints, not the theologians. A saint may not be in the least qualified to give an opinion on the date of a book or the theological accuracy of a definition. On such questions we consult the scholar or the theologian. On the other hand, if the opinions of the scholar or the theologian are inconsistent with the experi- ence of the saint, we may rightly hesitate to adopt them. The ascertainment of Christian truth calls for the effort of the whole man. It demands prayer no less than study. Spiritual vision is something deeper than intellectual vision.

We are bound then to hold together these two truths. First, the necessity of authority as representing the widest possible experience. Secondly, the duty of the individual to strive after truth. It is very easy for either side to be exaggerated.

(c) In the Church of Rome the compelling power of authority is often isolated and distorted. The demand is made that the teaching of the Church should be accepted without enquiry. Where she has spoken, the use of reason is either superfluous or an act of rebellion. Her exposition of any passage of Scripture forecloses all investigation inte its meaning. Thus authority acquires a military hue. The individual’s duty towards it is summed up in the one word ‘obedience.’ The idea of ‘con- sentient witness’ is abandoned. Against the official demands of the Church even conscience would seem to have no rights. The Church is viewed as an infallible guide on questions of morality and discipline, no less than of faith. Whether the Church has definitely pronounced on any given question is of course open to enquiry. Also, the exact meaning of official pronouncements may be disputed. But the general position is quite clear. The Church is inspired by God to declare truth. To question or reject her utterances is to doubt God. And for practical purposes ‘the Church’ tends to mean not the whole body of the faithful but the official teachers.

This attitude has more to say for itself than is often allowed, The ordinary man needs far more guidance than is often realized. He has neither the inclination nor the ability for independent theological enquiry. The authority of the Church gives him what he needs. Its doctrine is far more likely to be correct than his own, since it rests on a wider experience. The child needs instruction and the majority of men never rise beyond the stage at which continuous tutelage is necessary. On the other hand, the Roman use of authority differs from our Lord’s use of authority. Reason and conscience cannot be treated like private soldiers. A growth in knowledge and experience stimulates a spirit of enquiry. This must be met, not stifled. The wish to understand is not wrong. If the dogmatic teaching has been true it has nothing to fear from investigation. The Church teaches her doctrines because she believes them to be true: she does not believe them to be true because she teaches them. An insistence on the blind acceptance of any teaching

can only lead to scepticism or to the weakening of the spiritual fibre. On the defects of the Roman system see Tyrrell, Autobiography and

Life, vol. ii. appendix IIT.

(d) On the other hand, Liberal Theology and Protestantism isolate and exaggerate the claims of private judgment. Authority is regarded as an unreasonable tyranny, imposing upon the mind by an arbitrary decree statements of belief that are incredible. The individual is made the sole judge of truth. Every man is to be his own theologian. Such a view carried to extremes denies the corporate nature of all truth. It also rests on a false conception of authority. While we allow that if a man, after study and prayer, is in the end convinced that a doctrine is untrue, he is in duty bound to deny it and if need be sever himself from the Church that professes it as an integral part of her Creed, still he must remember that the probability is that on any given point authority is right and he is wrong. Authority represents a wider experience and an ampler wisdom. He is therefore bound to show good reason for his decision. Every man has the right to his own opinion, but this right carries with it the duty of taking the utmost pains to collect evidence upon which to form a sound opinion. Mere rebellion against authority is foolish. The indulgence of premature and hasty prejudices shows not a passion for truth but an intellectual arrogance. A home-made theology may be a very narrow theology. There are, indeed, too often occasions on which the principle of authority has been mis- used to suppress liberty of thought, but if rightly used authority is the minister and not the foe of true liberty. From the very nature of the case the Church is bound to exercise authority on matters of doctrine. To adapt some words of Bishop Creighton, we must not confuse the right of every individual to his own opinion with the duty of an institution to mean something.

On authority, see further : Leckie, Authority in Religion, esp. cc. vi.-vii. Headlam, History, Authority and Religion, Lect. II.

Tyrrell, Mediaevalism, cc. viii. and xv. Our Place in Christendom, Lect. VIII. (Gore).

§6. The limitation of the Church’s authority in doctrine may be seen by certain examples in which the Church of Rome has added to the revelation in Scripture.

Notes

• Cp. C. H. Turner, Camb. Mediaeval History, vol. i. pp. 164-166.
• Cp. a valuable passage in Rackham, Acts, pp. 266-270.